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The 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) represents the most significant change
to U.S. personal and corporate income taxation since the 1986 Tax Reform
Act. The TCJA’s personal tax changes reduced the top marginal tax rate,
eliminated exemptions, expanded the child tax credit, expanded the standard
deduction, lowered the cap on future mortgage-interest deductions, and intro-
duced a $10,000 limitation on the amount of state and local taxes (SALT) that
can be deducted. Previously there was no limit, except for those subject to
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). This paper estimates the effect of these
changes on U.S. households and demonstrates that the reduction in taxes and
corresponding increase in remaining lifetime spending differentially affected
residents of particular states, which we classify as blue, red or purple based
on their recent voting behavior in presidential elections.
Our analysis is based on a detailed life-cycle consumption-smoothing pro-
gram called The Fiscal Analyzer, or TFA, described in Kotlikoff (2019). Auer-
bach, et al.(2016, 2017, and 2018) have used TFA to study overall fiscal pro-
gressivity, remaining marginal net lifetime tax rates on working, and the pro-
gressivity of the TCJA. This study is the first use of TFA to study how changes
in federal taxes differentially impact households who differ not only by resource
percentile within age cohort, but also by state.
To explore red-blue TCJA differences, we designate states, including the
District of Columbia, as blue, red or purple based on the average voter margin
over the past five presidential elections. States where the Republican share of
total votes was, on average, five percentage points higher than the Democratic
share of total votes over the past five presidential elections are classified as
red. States where the Democratic share of total votes was, on average, five
percentage points higher than the Republican share of total votes over the
past five presidential elections are classified as blue. The remaining states are
classified as purple.
To examine the distributional impact of the TCJA, we classify households
in the Federal Reserve Board’s 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) into
“resource” percentiles based on how much human wealth (such as wage income)
and non-human wealth (such as home equity) they are projected to have over
their lifetime relative to their same-aged peers.1 Lifetime resources for house-
holds, along with lifetime spending and net-taxes (taxes minus transfers), are
projected using TFA, which incorporates details of all major federal and state
tax and transfer payment policies.
TFA also incorporates pre-TCJA personal and corporate-income tax codes.
As an output, TFA imputes and projects all taxes paid over the lifetime, dis-
counting all to present value.2 Hence, it can be used to measure the TCJA-
induced percentage change in the discounted present value of remaining life-
time spending for each SCF household. To determine differences in annual
TCJA treatment by state, each SCF household is run through TFA 51 times
(once for each state, and the District of Columbia). In each of these 51 runs
through TFA, state-specific fiscal policies are applied and state-specific weights
are assigned to each SCF observation.
Throughout our analysis we assume that the provisions of the TCJA are
1Households are grouped into 6 age buckets: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, and 70-79.
2Federal and state corporate income taxes are assumed to be 100 percent borne by owners of
all assets. Employer-paid FICA taxes are assumed to be 100 percent borne by workers.
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made permanent. According to our findings, red-state households enjoy, on
average, a 1.6 percent increase in lifetime spending (henceforth, spending) due
to permanent implementation of the TCJA. This compares to a 1.3 percent
increase in spending for blue-state households. The state with the highest gain
– 2.1 percent – is Wyoming – a red state. The state with the smallest gain –
0.9 percent – is California- a blue state.
The red-blue differential is explained by the limitation on the SALT de-
duction. Excluding the SALT limitation from TCJA, the average red-state
spending gain is 1.9 percent versus 2.1 percent for blue states. In particular,
"rich" households in red states receive less favorable treatment than "rich"
households in blue states, where SALT tend to be much higher. For example,
red-state households in the top 10 percent of the national age-specific resource
distribution receive a 2.0 percent boost to their remaining lifetime spending
compared to just 1.2 percent for blue-state top 10-percenters. If changes to
SALT had not occurred, the gains in spending would have been very similar for
the top 10 percent regardless of state. In our “NO SALT” scenario, the richest
10 percent of households in red states would receive a 2.6 percent increase in
spending versus 2.7 percent in blue states. Thus the differential between the
top 10% in red and blue states is driven almost entirely by SALT.
This paper proceeds in section 2 with a brief overview of the TCJA. Section
3 presents our data and methodology for computing the change in lifetime
spending. Section 4 presents basic results and then considers the extent to
which differences by state are due to socioeconomic factors or state tax policies,
including SALT. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) was the most comprehensive tax
reform passed since the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In addition to modifying
individual income tax rates, including reducing the top rate from 39.6 percent
to 37.0 percent, the TCJA modified amounts and/or limits for a number of
important individual tax credits, deductions, exemptions and penalties. In
particular, the standard deduction was nearly doubled for both individual and
married filers, thresholds for the Alternative Minimum Tax and the estate
tax were raised, and a $10,000 limit for itemized deductions on state and
local taxes was introduced. No Democrat voted for the passage of the TCJA,
while only 12 House Republicans voted against passage. All but one of the
12 Republicans that voted "no" represented “blue” states. In many of these
cases, the limit on the SALT deduction was cited as a factor in their vote.3
This is not the first time SALT deductions have been under fire. The
complete elimination of SALT deductions was included in the initial Reagan
Administration Treasury Department 1984 tax reform proposal. However,
apart from removing deductibility of retail sales taxes4, there were no other
3The Senate passed the TCJA 51 to 48 with no Republicans voting against it and no
Democrates voting for it. Of the 12 House Republicans voting against TCJA, five were from
New York, four from New Jersey, two from California, and one from the “red” state of North
Carolina. For examples of Congressional statements citing the SALT deduction limit as a fac-
tor in the “no” votes, see https://zeldin.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-zeldin-votes-no-
final-tax-reform-bill, https://stefanik.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/stefanik-oppose-final-
tax-bill, and https://www.silive.com/news/2017/12/rep_donovan_voted_no_on_final.html.
4Deductibility was partially restored with the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Sammartino
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changes to SALT deductibility in the 1986 Act (Lindsey, 1986).
Prior to the passage of the TCJA, there was evidence to suggest that blue
states might be hurt if SALT were to be modified. For example, Sammartino
and Rueben (2016) used the Urban-Institute Brookings Tax Policy Center
Microsimulation Model (UBTPC model) to show that repealing, modifying or
replacing SALT deductibility would have the most adverse effects for average
federal tax rates in high-tax states with a relatively large number of high-
income households, such as New York and Connecticut (both of which are
blue). The least adverse effects were found for low-tax states, such as South
Dakota and Wyoming (both of which are red).
Since the passage of the TCJA, several researchers have studied the impact
of the law along party lines. Auerbach et al.(2018) concluded that the reforms
in the TCJA were, on the whole, neither progressive nor regressive. However,
Sammartino et al.(2018) found that among the U.S. states, there were “win-
ners” and “losers”. Using the UBTPC model, these authors also found that for
2018 income and tax outcomes, the TCJA was more beneficial for red states
than for blue.5 In terms of 2018 outcomes, Sammartino et al. also found the
TCJA’s $10,000 SALT limit was much of the reason the low-tax state of Texas
benefited more, on average, than the high-tax state of New York.
A limitation of Sammartino et al. (2018) is the use of traditional static tax
burden analysis, which compares current taxes with current income. Auerbach
et al.(2018) point out the limitation of this approach, arguing that a forward-
looking, lifetime approach is more consistent with economic theory and can
produce different answers than static analysis. As in Auerbach et al.(2018),
the focus of this study is whether permanent implementation of the TCJA
disproportionately impacts red or blue states in terms of the discounted present
value of remaining lifetime spending and/or remaining lifetime tax rates. We
say permanent because a number of the individual tax provisions in the TCJA
are set to expire within 10 years to permit passage with a simple majority of
voters in the Senate under the reconciliation process. Following Auerbach et
al.(2018), we assume that these expiring provisions will eventually be made
permanent.6
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 Creating Resource Percentiles
Throughout this analysis we examine changes in spending at different points in
the resource distribution, referring to those in the top 10 percent of resources
as the “rich” and those in the bottom 10 percent of resources as the “poor”.
To create these resource percentiles, we first calculate the amount of resources
and Rueben 2016).
5In particular, the authors found that six of the seven states realizing an average after-tax
income increase of more than 2.1 percent were red, whereas the three states with increases of less
than 1.5 percent were blue. Moreover, the six states, including D.C., where more than 8.0 percent
of their tax payers had an increase in their 2018 taxes as a result of the TCJA were all blue and
the five states where less than 4.0 percent of their tax payers had increased 2018 taxes were all
red.
6We don’t estimate the effect on pre-tax incomes here. Simulations of the Global Gaidar Model
do suggest the TJCA could, over time, raise real before-tax wages by as much as 5.5 percent (see
Benzell, Kotlikoff and Lagarda, 2017a and 2017b). We do not consider that scenario here.
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each household is expected to have over their lifetime. R (hereafter resources),
is the sum of private net wealth, W, and human wealth, H. H is the expected
discounted present value of the household’s pre-tax remaining lifetime earn-
ings from all sources and W is the expected discounted present value of the
household’s assets, such as home equity and savings for retirement.
R = H + W (1)
Details on the calculation of equation (1) are contained in subsection 3.3 below,
“The Fiscal Analyzer.”
We group households within ten-year age cohorts and then rank each house-
hold’s resources to create resource percentiles. As in Auerbach et al.(2018),
our ten-year age groups reference households whose heads are 20-29, 30-39,
40-49, 50-59, 60-69 and 70-79. Thus, the “rich” consist of the 10 percent high-
est resource households among heads in their twenties, the top 10 percent of
heads in their 30s, etc..7
We create resource percentiles within age groups for three reasons. First,
young households have yet to pay the bulk of their lifetime taxes or receive the
bulk of their lifetime transfers. Second, old households have already paid most
of their lifetime taxes and have, in many cases, already received a significant
share of their lifetime transfers. Third, the life-cycle model predicts what
we see in the figure below – remaining lifetime resources ultimately decline
with age. This means that lumping together different age groups will treat
older people as poorer than younger people even if they have identical lifetime
resources measured as of, say age 20.
Figure 1: Average Lifetime Resources by Age Group and Marital Status
7As in Auerbach et al.(2016, 2017, 2018), prior to ranking the households, we adjust for house-
hold size and economies of shared living by dividing resources for married couples by the square
root of two.
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3.2 Computing TCJA-Induced Percentage Changes
in Spending of Households in Specific Age and Re-
source Percentile Groups
A household’s expected discounted present value of remaining lifetime spend-
ing, S, is defined as the difference between resources, R, and the expected
discounted present value of remaining lifetime net taxes, T, computed as total
taxes paid less transfer payments received.8
S = R− T. (2)
Throughout this analysis, we consider changes in lifetime spending as a result
of the TCJA for particular groups (e.g. the rich). To compute group-specific
changes in spending under the TCJA, we sum the weighted reduction in taxes
for all households in the group and divide by the weighted sum of spending for
all within-group households pre-TCJA.9 The percent change in the spending











The weighting scheme in our calculations is described in section 3.5.
3.3 The Fiscal Analyzer
As detailed in Kotlikoff (2019), the Fiscal Analyzer (TFA) is a detailed life-
cycle consumption-smoothing program that incorporates borrowing constraints.
TFA calculates remaining lifetime net taxes and remaining lifetime spending
along all survival trajectories and then converts them to present values. TFA
includes all federal and state income and sales tax provisions in effect pre- and
post- TCJA. It also includes the 2015 changes to Social Security benefit provi-
sions. All federal and some state specific transfer programs are also included.
Transfer programs with eligibility and or benefits defined at the county level,
including Section 8 Housing Vouchers, Low Income Energy Assistance, and
Child Care Assistance are excluded for two reasons. First, detailed informa-
tion is difficult to find across all jurisdictions. Second, due to rationing not all
eligible applicants will obtain these benefits.
The specific list of tax and transfer programs included in our calculations
is as follows:
Taxes
The Federal Personal Income Tax




State Corporate Income Taxes
8Spending includes the expected discounted present value of any terminal bequests that arise
under a given survival path.
9The alternative method is to average, on a weighted basis, each household’s remaining lifetime
change in spending, but this would be heavily influenced by outliers.
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Medicare Part B Premiums





Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
Medicaid Benefits (state-specific)
Medicare Benefits
The Affordable Care Act (state-specific)
3.3.1 TFA’s Consumption-Smoothing Dynamic Program
TFA’s lifetime consumption smoothing procedure begins with the reading in
of household demographic and economic data. The demographic data include
marital status, birth dates of each spouse/partner, maximum ages of life of
spouse/partners, birth dates of children, ages at which children will leave the
household. The economic data include detailed measures of earnings and as-
sets (for both the past and the future).10 TFA assumes inflation and rates of
return on regular and retirement account assets, household debts, and current
primary home data.11 Preferences about the desired degree of consumption
smoothing are also included (i.e., the preferred age-living standard path).12
The degree and timing of future changes in Social Security benefits, federal
taxes, state taxes, and payroll taxes, are also incorporated into the calcu-
lations. While TFA is set up to use any data source, including data input
directly by an individual, in this study we feed it data on households in the
Survey of Consumer Finances (see section 3.4 below).
TFA’s default assumption, which can be changed, is that the household
seeks to have the same living standard per household member through time.
The program obeys the specified desired standard of living profile to the extent
possible without violating the household’s borrowing constraint. The program
simultaneously calculates not just the household’s smoothest living standard
path, but also its time-varying demands for life insurance (and, thus, the living
10These include past Social Security covered labor earnings, current labor earnings and pro-
jected future labor earnings, regular (non-retirement account) assets, 401(k) and other deductible
retirement account assets, Roth retirement assets, current and projected future contributions to
each type of retirement account, retirement-account withdrawal choices (start and end date, an-
nuitization and order of withdraws as between Roth and 401(k)-type accounts), Social Security
benefit collection choices, defined benefit pensions, information on retirement income from non
Social Security-covered employment (this triggers Social Security WEP and GPO provisions).
11Rent, mortgage amounts, mortgage lengths, mortgage payments, property taxes, condo fees,
homeowners insurance, maintenance, etc. are included, as well as up to two future changes in the
primary home, symmetric data on the current vacation home data and up to two changes in the
vacation home, other real estate properties.
12Other items included are funeral expenses, desired bequests, current life insurance (face and
cash values), preferences about maintaining living standards of survivors, contingent plans (e.g.,
what survivors will earn and how they will change their housing), and the maximum amount the
household can borrow.
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insurance premiums it will pay each year) and each of the above-referenced
taxes and transfer payments.13
The problem TFA solves is computationally challenging for three reasons.
First, there are tens of thousands of potential paths that could occur. These
alternate paths include, for example, various levels of regular and spouse-
specific retirement account assets in the future when both spouses survive, and
also in each future year when one spouse is deceased and the other alive. Take,
for example, a 40 year-old couple that could live to 100. There are over 200,000
survivor contingent regular and retirement account state variables. Second,
annual taxes, annual transfer payments, annual discretionary spending, and
annual life insurance holdings must be determined simultaneously since taxes
and life insurance premiums constrain what can be spent. But what is spent
through time determines the path of asset income, which helps determine the
path of taxes. Third, the program needs to run in finite time to be useful for
research.
TFA’s algorithm handles these complexities in a highly efficient manner.
Indeed, it solves the typical SCF observation’s consumption-smoothing, net
taxation, and life insurance needs problem within a half second and does so
with precision below $1.
3.4 The Use of The Survey of Consumer Finances
The Federal Reserve’s 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) collected
highly detailed data from 6254 households. These data included detailed in-
formation on household labor and asset income, assets and liabilities, and
demographic characteristics.14
The SCF combines an area-probability sample of households with a “list”
sample of generally wealthier households from administrative tax records from
the IRS. The SCF includes sampling weights to account for oversampling of
wealthier households from inclusion of the “list” sample and for differential
response rates among wealthier groups15. The oversampling of wealthy house-
holds allows for inference about households in the top 1 percent of the resource
distribution.16
We run each household in the SCF through TFA to generate the TCJA-
induced change in taxes and spending for each household. As in Auerbach et
al. (2016, 2018), we restrict our analysis to households with heads between
20 and 79 years old. The SCF does not collect data on respondents’ past
13The precise algorithm is proprietary to Economic Security Planning, Inc., which uses it in its
commercial lifetime financial planning tools. But its details are available to academic researchers
upon receipt of a request emailed to www.kotilkoff@gmail.com, subject to the signing of a non-
disclosure agreement.
14Using a multiple imputation algorithm, the Fed includes each household’s record in the public-
use SCF dataset in five so-called replicates to account for estimation of non-reported values (item
non-response) or for disclosure limitations. We use the first replicate for our analysis. Auerbach
et al. (2016, 2018) report no significant differences in results across replicates.
15Wealthier households have lower response rates, particularly at the highest levels. See Bricker
et al. (2016).
16For the 2004 SCF, Kennickell (2007) shows that 15.8 percent of sampled households were in
the top 1 percent of the net worth distribution for the U.S. with 96.4 percent of these coming from
the list sample. Another 38.5 percent of the 2004 SCF-sampled households were in the bottom 50
percent of the net worth distribution with only 5.7 percent of these households coming from the
list sample.
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earnings histories, which is needed for TFA’s Social Security benefit calcu-
lation. Consequently, we follow the methodology in Auerbach et al. (2016,
2018) to impute past earnings and forecast future earnings using past waves of
the Current Population Survey through 2013. Future mortality of household
members, assumed to begin at age 55 and end with certain death at age 100,
is also projected using the method described in Auerbach et al. (2016, 2018).
And, as in that study, the present value of human resources, spending and net
taxes are calculated as probability weighted averages of their outcomes for all
possible survivor paths for either a single person or married couple. Kotlikoff
(2019) provides details of updates to TFA subsequent to the Auerbach et al.
(2016, 2018) studies.
3.5 Generating State-Level Results
The SCF is a nationwide survey and its household weights permit data aggre-
gations that are representative of the nation, but not of any particular state.
While the SCF does collect geographic-specific identifiers, like the state-county
FIPS code, they are not available in the public use survey data. Moreover,
the sample design of the SCF is not constructed to be representative of states,
or other geographies, according to correspondence with administrators of the
survey.
In the absence of reliable SCF state-specific data, we perform our state-
by-state analysis by running each household in the SCF through TFA for
each state and Washington D.C., assuming in each of the 51 runs that all SCF
households lived in the same state. That is, we ran all SCF households through
TFA under the assumption that they all lived in Alabama, then Alaska, etc..
To form state-specific statistics, we impute a separate weight for each
household by doing a statistical match of the SCF data with data from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s 2016 American Community’s Survey (ACS).17 In particular,
we first restrict both the SCF and ACS to household heads between the ages
of 20 and 79. We then partition households into 1536 distinct cells (c) based
on the household head’s age, race/ethnicity, marital status and educational
attainment as well as the value of the primary residence, total household in-
come in 2015 and the presence or absence of at least one child under 17 years
of age. For households in a given cell-c, we create the household’s weight for
each state by multiplying their SCF sample weight by the weighted fraction
of cell-c households in the 2016 ACS that reside in that state. Thus, the sum
of all state weights for each state will equal the population of that state. We
then duplicate all of the data 51 times, running it through TFA to apply all
state specific tax and transfer program rules.18 We are left with more than
4,500 SCF records in each of the 51-state residencies.
Note that the categorization of rich and poor by resources R is done at
the national level. Thus, examination of the “rich” is not done within the
household’s assumed state of residence. So for example, California has a higher
weighted fraction of households (17.1 percent) in the top 10 percentile than
does Mississippi (4.5 percent), and has significantly more residents. Thus,
rich households in the U.S. are more likely to be located in California than in
Mississippi (18.2 percent of the top 10 percentile of households are in California
17The ACS includes over 1.3 million households covering 1 percent of the U.S. population.
18We remove households with a present value of spending under $5000 and households where
the program does not converge for every state in the sample.
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versus 0.4 percent in Mississippi).
4 Results
Here we present evidence that taxpayers living in states that tend to vote
Republican in presidential elections (red states) receive a greater benefit on
average from the TCJA than taxpayers living in states that tend to vote
Democrat (blue states). In particular, we find this state variation is driven by
those in top 10 percent of each age cohort’s resource distribution. This appears
largely due to variation in state and local taxes (SALT) and the TCJA law that
affected the ability to deduct these taxes. If we remove the $10,000 limitation
on SALT that was introduced in the TCJA, the variation by state mostly
disappears, particularly for the rich.
It’s possible that this state variation is due to differences in age, home
values or incomes across state. To test for this, we conduct an experiment
where we keep socioeconomic factors across states the same and only allow tax
policy to vary. We find our results essentially unchanged by this experiment,
suggesting differences across state are mostly due to differences in tax policies
between the states.
The first subsection below discusses the variation in the TCJA gains by
state and for different points in the resource distribution. In the second sub-
section, we remove the limitation on the amount of state and local taxes that
can be deducted. This adjustment enables us to see how states would have
fared if the SALT limitation had not been implemented. In the third subsec-
tion, we remove any socioeconomic differences between states and reexamine
the results.
4.1 Variation in the TCJA Gains
4.1.1 Variation by state
According to our calculations, households are projected to pay $25,000 less on
average, in present value, in net taxes over their lifetimes due to permanent
implementation of the TCJA. As indicated in equation (3) and described in
Kotlikoff (2019), TFA guarantees that any reduction in expected remaining
lifetime net taxes produces an equal-sized increase in expected remaining life-
time spending. Hence, the $25,000 decline in average tax payments translates
to a 1.5% increase in spending across all states.
Figure 2 below provides an overview of the TCJA’s impacts across the
country. The shade of green indicates the magnitude of the state’s gain in
lifetime spending. The darker the green, the larger the change in lifetime
spending of households in the state. States shaded darkest or second darkest
green experienced a 1.6 percent to 2.1 percent increase in remaining lifetime
spending per household. Households in states shaded very light or light green
experienced, on average, a 0.9 to 1.4 percentage increase in remaining lifetime
spending.
Figure 3, shows the percentage change in spending resulting from TCJA
on the left hand side and the absolute TCJA-induced spending increase on
the right hand side, ranked by the percentage change from high to low. The
state with the smallest percentage increase in lifetime spending is California
– a far leaning blue state – with a gain of 0.9 percent. The state with the
10
largest percentage increase is Wyoming- a far leaning red state- with a gain
of 2.1 percent. The ten states receiving the smallest percentage spending gain
from the tax reform are all blue. Moreover, of the 10 states with the highest
average percent TCJA lifetime spending gains, only one, Washington State, is
blue. Seven are red and three are purple.
The right side of the figure shows lifetime spending changes in absolute
dollar terms. Some states that had a relatively small percentage change aver-
aged relatively larger absolute spending increases. New Jersey is an example.
It’s spending increase was the ninth lowest in percentage terms (1.3 percent),
but it’s absolute increase in spending exceeds that of all but two of the red
states ($31,000).
Figure 2: Average Percentage Change in Household Lifetime Spending Resulting
from TCJA
Note: Dots indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
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Figure 3: Change in Lifetime Spending Resulting From TCJA
Rank ordered by percent change in TCJA gains
Note: Color of bars indicate if state is red, blue, or purple. We define red states as those that
voted Republican in the past five presidential elections by a margin of 5 or more percentage
points, on average. Blue states, are those that on average voted Democratic by a margin of 5 or
more percentage points in the past five presidential elections. The remaining states are
designated as purple states
The left hand side of Figure 3 suggests a systematic relationship between
a state’s political leanings and the percentage increase in spending due to the
change in tax policy. As shown in figure 4, there is in fact a distinct positive
relationship between the percentage gain from TJCA and the voting pattern of
the state. Figure 4 plots for each state its average percentage change in lifetime
12
spending against its average net Republican voter margin over the past five
presidential elections. The correlation between the two variables is 0.5. The
weighted regression of each state’s percentage spending change from TCJA
on a constant and its average Republican voter margin yields a coefficient of
0.009 with a standard error of 0.000002. In other words, a ten percentage
point higher Republican voter margin corresponds to a 0.09 percentage point
higher increase in average lifetime spending due to TJCA.
Grouping states together into their Republican or Democratic leanings
yields an average of a 1.6 percent gain for red states versus a 1.3 percent
gain for blue states. This 30 basis point difference is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. The average lifetime spending gain for purple states is
also 1.6 percent and is significantly different from average lifetime spending of
blue states at the 1 percent level.
Figure 4: Change in Lifetime Spending Resulting from TCJA
Note: Dots indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
4.1.2 State Variation by Resource Level
State variation in per household average TCJA gains differs by income level.
TCJA’s biggest impact on the middle- and lower-income households was through
its elimination of exemptions, increase in the standard deduction, and, in fami-
lies with children, increase in the child tax credit. Because the standard deduc-
tion changed by such a large amount (from $6,350 to $12,000 for single filers,
from $12,700 to $24,000 for married filing jointly and widowed tax payers, and
from $9,350 to $18,000 for head of household filers), the Joint Committee on
Taxation expects that relatively few people - 18 million (12 percent) down
from 46 million (31 percent) – will gain from itemizing their deductions when
they file their taxes in 2019. Table 1 shows how the number of people itemizing
deductions is expected to change over time by income category.
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Table 1: Estimated Number of Taxpayers Who Itemize Deductions: 2017 vs 2018
(in thousands)
Income 2017 2018 Percentage Change
Less than $50,000 5,445 1,501 -72
$50,000 to $100,000 13,305 11,091 -17
$100,000 to $200,000 17959 6513 -64
$200,000 to $500,000 8207 4185 -49
$500,000 to $1,000,000 1089 791 -27
$1,000,000 and over 509 444 -13
Total, All Taxpayers 46514 18012 -61
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation
Note: Income is adjusted gross income plus (1) tax-exempt interest, (2) employer contributions
for health plans and life insurance, (3) employer share of FICA tax, (4) workers’ compensation,
(5) nontaxable Social Security benefits, (6) insurance value of Medicare benefits, (7) alternative
minimum tax preference items, (8) individual share of business taxes, and (9) excluded income of
U.S. citizens living abroad. Categories are measured at 2018 levels. Table includes non filers, but
excludes dependent filers and returns with negative income.
Table 2 shows how the value of the SALT deduction has changed between
2017 and 2018 for different ranges of income. In total, the amount of tax
deductions under SALT is expected to fall from $109 billion to $20 billion,
most of which stems from a reduction in the benefits for those with incomes
over $100,000. In 2017, nearly all of the total value of SALT deductions – $99.7
billion out of $109 billion – accrued to those with incomes over $100,000. In
2018 taxes, this number is expected to fall to just $17 billion, a reduction of
$82 billion.
Table 2: Estimated Value of the SALT Deduction by Income
2017 2018
Income category Returns (000s) Millions ($) Returns (000s) Millions ($)
Less than $50,000 3,303 915 799 224
$50,000 to $100,000 11,988 8,796 4,097 2,580
$100,000 to $200,000 17,650 27,878 6,382 6,920
$200,000 to $500,000 7,816 26,160 4,148 7,081
$500,000 to $1,000,000 1,015 11,491 780 2,191
$1,000,000 and over 490 34,202 418 1,287
Total, All Taxpayers 42,262 109,443 16,624 20,282
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation
Note: Income is adjusted gross income (AGI) plus: (1) tax-exempt interest, (2) employer contribu-
tions for health plans and life insurance,(3) employer share of FICA tax, (4) worker’s compensation,
(5) nontaxable Social Security benefits, (6) insurance value of Medicare benefits, (7) alternative
minimum tax preference items, (8) individual share of business taxes, and (9) excluded income of
U S. citizens living abroad. Categories are measured at 2018 levels.
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The amount of SALT a household pays is a function of the household’s
home value, the nature of property taxation (millage rate, assessment policy,
homestead exemptions, etc.), income and the state’s income tax rate. The
extent to which these factors vary by state will greatly affect the amount of
state and local taxes paid, and thus how much can potentially be deducted.
State and local tax rates vary substantially by state. As shown in table 3, blue
states tend to face slightly higher taxes (11.5 percent for the median household
in blue states versus 10.1 percent in red states). Further, the lowest state and
local tax rate is 5.7% in Alaska (a red state) and the highest state and local
tax rate is 14.5% in Illinois (a blue state). The average home value among
blue states is also higher ($371 thousand versus $209 thousand).19







Amount of State and
Local Taxes for Me-
dian State Household
Red 10.2 % $208,620 $ 5,219
Blue 11.3 % $370,863 $ 7,950
Purple 11 % $260,233 $ 6,371
All 10.8 % $274,991 $ 6,386
Source: Kiernan, John. "2019 Tax Rates by State" and authors’ calculations from the
American Community Survey
Note: State and local taxes include real estate taxes, vehicle property taxes, income taxes and
sales excise taxes. Assumes “Median State Household” has an annual income equal to the mean
third quintile income of the state, owns a home at a value equal to the median of the state, owns
a car valued at $24,350 (the highest-selling car of 2018); and spends annually an amount equal to
the spending of a household earning the median state income. Assumes "Median U.S. Household”
has an annual income of mean third quintile of U.S. income ($58,082), owns a home valued at
median U.S. home value ($193,500), owns a car valued at $24,350 (the highest-selling car of 2018),
and spends annually an amount equal to the spending of a household earning the median U.S.
income.
19See the Appendix for a full list of average home values and income tax rates by state.
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With itemized deductions far less important to middle- and low-income
households, one would expect small differences by state in the TCJA’s treat-
ment of such households. That’s not the case for high-income households. As
table 1 indicates, among households with more than $1 million in annual in-
come only 13 percent fewer households are expected to itemize deductions in
2018 compared to 2017. In contrast, among households with incomes below
$50,000, there’s a 72 percent predicted decline in itemizers. Since the largest
itemizable deduction for high-income households is SALT, the TCJA’s lim-
itation of the SALT deduction to $10,000 is particularly onerous for higher
income households living in high SALT states.
Thus, it’s not surprising that when we narrow figure 4 to households who
rank among the richest 10 percent in their age cohort by resources, we find
even more variation by state in TCJA’s average household treatment. Impor-
tantly, the relationship between Republican voter margin and percent change
in lifetime spending resulting from the TCJA becomes even stronger (see Fig-
ure 5). The weighted regression of each state’s percentage spending change
from the TCJA on a constant and its average Republican voter margin yields a
coefficient of 0.02 with a standard error of 0.00001. In other words, a ten per-
centage point higher Republican voter margin corresponds to a 0.2 percentage
point higher increase in lifetime spending. In contrast, at the opposite side
of the income distribution, those in the bottom 10th percentile, experienced
similar gains under the TCJA across states (see Figure 6 below).
Figure 5: Percentage Change in Lifetime Spending Resulting from TCJA by Re-
publican Voter Margin, Richest 10 Percent of Households
Note: Dots indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
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Figure 6: Percentage Change in Lifetime Spending Resulting from TCJA by Re-
publican Voter Margin, Poorest 10 Percent of Households
Note: Dots indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
4.2 The No-SALT Experiment
We next repeat our analysis of the TCJA’s differential treatment of the rich
in red versus blue states, but under the counterfactual assumption that TCJA
didn’t include a cap on SALT deductions. The left-hand-side of Figure 7 shows
average percentage spending changes by state, ranked from high to low, as in
Figure 3. The right-hand-side of figure 7 preserves the left-hand-side ordering
of states, but displays the spending impact of the TCJA assuming it had been
passed with no SALT deduction limitation.
The importance of SALT is apparent. On average, spending would in-
creases by 2.0 percent under the no-SALT scenario versus 1.5 percent under
the TCJA. In addition, the red-blue differential is reversed in this scenario:
Households in blue states experience a 30 basis point increase in spending
relative to those in red states (instead of 30 basis points lower under TCJA).
The ten states with the smallest TCJA spending gains with the SALT
limitation experience a notably larger spending increase without the limitation.
Instead of experiencing an average spending gain of 1.1 percent under the
permanent version of TCJA as legislated, they would have experienced a 2.1
percent gain had the SALT provisions been excluded. This is nearly the same
as the average gain of 2.0 percent across all states under the no-SALT scenario.
Figure 8 repeats this experiment for the top 10 percent of households.
Importantly, the same result described with respect to the average across states
is generally true when we restrict attention to the rich: There is much less
variation across states in the TCJA gains under the no-SALT scenario. But
the difference between TCJA and no-SALT is larger among those in the top
10 percentile. The average gain under the no-SALT scenario for the top 10th
percentile is 2.6 percent, compared to 1.5 percent under the TCJA. There
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is essentially no difference between the TCJA and no-SALT TCJA for the
bottom 10 percentile (with both scenarios producing a gain of 0.4 percent).
Figure 7: Change in Lifetime Spending: TCJA versus no-SALT Change Scenario
Rank ordered by TCJA gains
Note: Color of bars indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
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Figure 8: Change in Lifetime Spending: TCJA versus no-SALT Change Scenario
Rank ordered by TCJA gains
Richest 10 Percent of Households
Note: Color of bars indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
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4.3 Removing Socioeconomic Factors
The differential impact of TCJA that we report above is a result of both
differences in tax policies across states and differences in demographic char-
acteristics across states. With respect to the effect of demographics, consider
for a state which is much younger than an otherwise identical state. Because
the older rich are more likely than the younger rich to itemize, TCJA will
appear to be benefiting the younger state relative to the older state simply
because SALT deduction restrictions will disproportionately impact the lat-
ter. In order to isolate the influence of state-level tax policies from state-level
demographics, we repeat the experiments cited above using U.S. weights from
the SCF, rather than the state-specific weights described in subsection 3.5
above.
The results of these experiments are shown below in Figure 9. The column
on the left is the same as the left column of Figure 7 above and shows the
change in lifetime spending under the TCJA with the state specific weights
applied. The column on the right shows what happens if the U.S. weights
are applied to each state instead. If socioeconomic differences between states
are driving the state by state variation in the TCJA gains, those differences
should be revealed in a comparison of these two columns.
While there are differences for specific states, the average TCJA gain is 1.5
percent with uniform weights as opposed to 1.6 percent with state weights.
This suggests that the variation in the TCJA gains by state are mostly a
function of differences in tax polices between states.
Importantly, significant differences across states remain even when socioe-
conomic factors are identical between states. The state with the biggest gain
is Nevada (2.0 percent) and the state with the smallest gain is Oregon (1.1
percent). Further, as shown in Figure 10 below, this is also true for the rich-
est 10 percent of households. The average gain in spending under the TCJA
for the top 10 percent calculated with state-weights is 1.6 percent versus 1.5
percent when US weights are applied.
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Figure 9: Change in Lifetime Spending Resulting from TCJA
State Specific Demographics versus Uniform Demographics
Rank ordered by TCJA gains
Note: Color bars indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
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Figure 10: Change in Lifetime Spending Resulting from TCJA
State Specific Demographics versus Uniform Demographics
Rank ordered by TCJA gains
Richest 10 percent of households
Note: Color of bars indicate if state is red, blue, or purple.
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5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the state-by-state effects deriving from permanent
implementation of the TCJA. We find a small but important difference in the
effects on households across red and blue states. Households in red states
enjoyed, on average, a 1.6 percent increase in remaining lifetime spending due
to the TCJA compared with 1.3 percent for blue-state households. Among
the top 10 percent of households, the differential is larger. Rich households in
red states enjoyed a 2.0 percent increase relative to a 1.2 increase among the
rich in blue states.
The major factor underlying the TCJA’s distinct impact on rich households
across red and blue states is the TCJA’s $10,000 limitation on the deductibil-
ity of SALT – state and local taxes. Indeed, as we show, almost all of the
difference in the TCJA’s treatment of the rich in red and blue states reflects
TCJA’s SALT deduction limitation. Furthermore, it appears that these differ-
ential effects are mainly driven by differences in state tax policies, as opposed
to differences in demographics across states (including income and property
values).
There are a host of interesting questions that arise from the observations
reported in this (and related) work. Do households have incentives to vote
for one candidate versus another based on perceived tax advantages offered by
the competing political parties? Do voters act on these incentives? As shown
by Feldstein and Metcalf (1987), for those that itemize, SALT deductibilty
acts as a federal subsidy for state and local tax collections at the rate of their
marginal federal tax rate. Gramlich (1985) notes that removal of this subsidy,
and the possible consequences in terms of lower state and local government
spending, may result in migration of high-income households from high-tax
areas to low-tax areas. Will this prediction hold if, as we assume here, the
relevant TCJA provisions remain permanent?
Answers to these questions are well beyond the scope of our analysis here.
But our results begin to develop a factual basis for potentially addressing these
and a variety of other political economy questions.
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Amount of State and
Local Taxes for Me-
dian State Household
Alaska 5.7 % $286189 $ 4439
Delaware 6.1 % $271288 $ 4047
Montana 7.1 % $269771 $ 3968
Wyoming 8.1 % $278089 $ 4902
Nevada 8.2 % $283458 $ 4797
Utah 8.4 % $293591 $ 5638
Florida 8.4 % $270802 $ 4396
Idaho 8.6 % $226958 $ 4431
Colorado 8.7 % $374343 $ 6009
Tennessee 8.7 % $204838 $ 4183
District of Columbia 8.9 % $679321 $ 8487
California 8.9 % $625349 $ 7703
South Carolina 9 % $211428 $ 4415
Oregon 9.1 % $332659 $ 5948
Alabama 9.1 % $175313 $ 4186
West Virginia 9.7 % $157126 $ 4167
Arizona 9.7 % $259099 $ 5350
New Hampshire 9.9 % $286830 $ 7152
North Dakota 10 % $208900 $ 5850
New Mexico 10.4 % $214359 $ 4931
Georgia 10.4 % $222388 $ 5403
Louisiana 10.5 % $193820 $ 4922
Hawaii 10.6 % $685545 $ 8826
North Carolina 10.6 % $216827 $ 5340
Virginia 10.7 % $337009 $ 7409
Source: Kiernan, John. "2019 Tax Rates by State" and Author’s calculations from the
American Community Survey
Note: State and local taxes include real estate taxes, vehicle property taxes, income taxes and
sales excise taxes. Assumes “Median State Household” has an annual income equal to the mean
third quintile income of the state, owns a home at a value equal to the median of the state, owns
a car valued at $24,350 (the highest-selling car of 2018); and spends annually an amount equal to
the spending of a household earning the median state income. Assumes "Median U.S. Household”
has an annual income of mean third quintile of U.S. income ($58,082), owns a home valued at
median U.S. home value ($193,500), owns a car valued at $24,350 (the highest-selling car of 2018);
and spends annually an amount equal to the spending of a household earning the median U.S.
income.
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Amount of State and
Local Taxes for Me-
dian State Household
Massachusetts 10.8 % $444081 $ 9175
South Dakota 11 % $197356 $ 5626
Vermont 11.2 % $259807 $ 6992
Arkansas 11.3 % $162859 $ 4850
Minnesota 11.3 % $249862 $ 7185
Missouri 11.3 % $195100 $ 5653
Oklahoma 11.4 % $169411 $ 5297
Maryland 11.4 % $368012 $ 9392
Maine 11.7 % $222236 $ 6323
Indiana 11.8 % $167347 $ 5814
Mississippi 12 % $152118 $ 5056
Washington 12.1 % $381518 $ 8716
Kentucky 12.3 % $172111 $ 5609
New Jersey 12.4 % $395402 $ 11119
Michigan 12.4 % $182871 $ 5951
Texas 12.7 % $220989 $ 6576
Iowa 12.9 % $179461 $ 6546
Ohio 13.1 % $176557 $ 6247
Rhode Island 13.2 % $303227 $ 8667
Wisconsin 13.3 % $211559 $ 7199
Kansas 13.4 % $185462 $ 6813
Nebraska 13.4 % $179799 $ 6778
New York 13.7 % $435167 $ 10074
Pennsylvania 13.8 % $222075 $ 7580
Connecticut 14.4 % $377209 $ 10987
Illinois 14.9 % $247626 $ 8585
Source: Kiernan, John. "2019 Tax Rates by State" and Author’s calculations from the
American Community Survey
Note: State and local taxes include real estate taxes, vehicle property taxes, income taxes and
sales excise taxes. Assumes “Median State Household” has an annual income equal to the mean
third quintile income of the state, owns a home at a value equal to the median of the state, owns
a car valued at $24,350 (the highest-selling car of 2018); and spends annually an amount equal to
the spending of a household earning the median state income. Assumes "Median U.S. Household”
has an annual income of mean third quintile of U.S. income ($58,082), owns a home valued at
median U.S. home value ($193,500), owns a car valued at $24,350 (the highest-selling car of 2018);
and spends annually an amount equal to the spending of a household earning the median U.S.
income.
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